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Recognising the Sentience of 
Animals in Law: A Justification 
and Framework for Australian 
States and Territories 
Jane Kotzmann 
Abstract 
Scientific research is clear that most animals are sentient. This means that they 
have the capacity to subjectively perceive or feel things such as happiness and 
suffering. At present in Australia, animal sentience is, to some degree, implicitly 
recognised in animal welfare legislation that is in operation in all state and 
territory jurisdictions. This legislation criminalises human cruelty towards some 
animals because of the capacity such action has to cause animal pain and 
suffering. There is growing public concern in Australia, however, that such 
legislation does not adequately protect animals from pain and suffering. The 
Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) has recently responded to this concern by 
passing amendments to the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT), which makes it the 
first Australian jurisdiction to explicitly recognise animal sentience. The ACT 
amendments follow international precedent. This article analyses this novel 
development in the law’s recognition of animal sentience. It considers the extent 
to which the ACT legislation is likely to enhance the protection of animals and 
whether it should be a paradigm, in this respect, for other Australian jurisdictions. 
It argues that the ACT amendments, while largely symbolic, are a welcome 
development, and other Australian jurisdictions should follow suit. Nevertheless, 
further legislative change to increase protections for animals is also required. 
I Introduction 
If you watch a Labrador retriever bound towards you, tail wagging and tongue 
hanging out, it appears that he or she is experiencing happiness. In contrast, 
observing a Whippet or Weimaraner pull his or her ears back, pace around, whine 
and paw suggests that the dog is feeling insecure and anxious. While such inferences 
may be anthropomorphic, research in relation to animal capabilities is clear that most 
animals are sentient.1 In this respect, sentience refers to the capacity to have 
                                                        
 Lecturer in International Law, Deakin University Law School, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. 
Email: j.kotzmann@deakin.edu.au; ORCID iD:  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1834-5480. Thank 
you to Associate Professor Gabrielle Wolf and anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback in 
relation to previous drafts of this article, and D’Arcy Hope and Gisela Nip for their research 
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1 Note this paper uses the term ‘animal’ to refer to all animals, excluding human beings. While human 
beings are themselves animals, this popular use of the term animal is helpful for the purposes of clear 
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feelings.2 Sentience requires a certain level of consciousness and intellectual 
capacity, and may include positive feelings such as happiness and pleasure, as well 
as negative states such as pain and suffering.3 In particular, it is clear that most 
animals have the capacity to feel both physical and psychological pain that is similar 
to that experienced by humans.4 
At present in Australia, states and territories are largely responsible for 
regulating animal welfare.5 Legislation in each of these jurisdictions implicitly 
recognises, to some degree, that some animals are sentient by criminalising human 
cruelty towards them and providing examples of such conduct, all of which would 
cause such animals to suffer. For example, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 
1979 (NSW) states that an act of cruelty towards an animal includes acts or omissions 
that ‘unreasonably, unnecessarily or unjustifiably’ cause the animal to experience 
pain.6 Such acts include beating, kicking, killing and wounding an animal.7 
In recent times, however, there has been growing public concern that, in light 
of the evidence that most animals are sentient, current laws do not adequately ensure 
animal wellbeing.8 Partly in response to such concerns, the Australian Capital 
Territory (‘ACT’) amended the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) (‘AWA’) by the 
                                                        
communication: see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House, 2015) xx. In relation to 
sentience, see Gary E Varner, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in 
Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism (Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 5 especially at 106; David J 
Mellor, ‘Welfare-Aligned Sentience: Enhanced Capacities to Experience, Interact, Anticipate, 
Choose and Survive’ (2019) 9(7) Animals 440; Philip Low, ‘The Cambridge Declaration on 
Consciousness’ (Conference Paper, Francis Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human 
and Non-Human Animals, 7 July 2012); Helen Lambert, Gemma Carder and Neil D’Cruze, ‘Given 
the Cold Shoulder: A Review of the Scientific Literature for Evidence of Reptile Sentience’ (2019) 
9(10) Animals 821; Helen S Proctor, Gemma Carder and Amelia R Cornish, ‘Searching for Animal 
Sentience: A Systematic Review of the Scientific Literature’ (2013) 3(3) Animals 882; Helen Proctor, 
‘Animal Sentience: Where Are We and Where Are We Heading?’ (2012) 2(4) Animals 628. See also 
the discussion at IIA below.  
2 Academic Press, Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior (online at 5 October 2020) vol 1, 2 Animal 
Welfare and Conservation, ‘Sentience’ [131]. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Hope Ferdowsian and Debra Merskin, ‘Parallels in Sources of Trauma, Pain, Distress, and 
Suffering in Humans and Nonhuman Animals’ (2012) 13(4) Journal of Trauma and Dissociation 
448, 461; David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, ‘Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and 
Humans’ (1991) 12(3) Theoretical Medicine 193, 208; Frank McMillan, ‘Psychological Trauma in 
Animals: PTSD and Beyond’ (Conference Paper, International Association of Animal Behavior 
Consultants Conference, 2 April 2011). 
5 The Australian Constitution lacks an express power enabling the Commonwealth Parliament to 
legislate with regard to animal welfare. Several indirect powers, however, empower the 
Commonwealth Parliament to pass legislation that relates to animals. For example, s 51(i) of the 
Australian Constitution, relating to trade and commerce, underpins Commonwealth legislation in 
relation to the live export of animals. See Alex Bruce, Animal Law in Australia: An Integrated 
Approach (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2018) 75–82. 
6 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s 4(2) (‘NSW Act’). 
7 Ibid s 4(2)(a). 
8 See, eg, Futureye, ‘Commodity or Sentient Being? Australia’s Shifting Mindset on Farm Animal 
Welfare’ (Research Report, 2018) 10; Transport Canberra and City Services, Animal Welfare 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (Consultation Report, May 2019) 8. Note that the term ‘wellbeing’ 
rather than ‘welfare’ is used here to distinguish the discussion from the animal welfare versus animal 
rights debate: see Jane Kotzmann and Nick Pendergrast, ‘Animal Rights: Time to Start Unpacking 
What Rights and for Whom’ (2019) 46(1) Mitchell Hamline Law Review 158. 
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Animal Welfare Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (ACT) (‘ACT amendments’).9 
The ACT amendments make the ACT the first Australian jurisdiction to explicitly 
recognise animals’ sentience in the law — as part of the objects of its animal 
protection legislation.10 The ACT amendments are also atypical in Australian animal 
welfare legislation in that they recognise the ‘intrinsic value’ of animals and that 
animals ‘deserve to be treated with compassion and have a quality of life that reflects 
their intrinsic value’.11 
The ACT amendments seem to constitute an important step in enhancing the 
legal protection of animals. Specifically, the amendments signify an attempt to 
soften the traditional legal approach to animals that constructs and treats them as 
property.12 This approach to animals permits humans to own animals and generally 
to treat them in any manner that suits their own interests, subject to the limited 
conditions placed on them by animal welfare legislation.13 This approach is found in 
the common law and statute. By way of example, s 4 of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) defines ‘goods’ to include animals — along with ships, 
aircraft and other vehicles. 
Recognition of animal sentience and animals’ intrinsic value in the ACT 
amendments has the potential to improve protection for some animals in that 
territory. This is primarily because courts are required to take into account the 
statutory purposes of the AWA, including the recognition of animals’ sentience, 
when interpreting the provisions of the AWA.14 This may be important in determining 
whether particular conduct that causes pain to an animal is ‘unjustifiable, 
unnecessary or unreasonable’ and thus constitutes cruelty.15 Case law from foreign 
jurisdictions, including that considering relevant provisions in the laws of New 
Zealand16 and Quebec,17 provides some indication of the influence that legal 
recognition of animal sentience might have in statutory interpretation.18 Moreover, 
the symbolic nature of such provisions should not be undervalued. In a context where 
animals are legally categorised as property, recognising that they are sentient, while 
not impacting their legal status, may be interpreted as a symbolic rejection of that 
categorisation. 
This article analyses the symbolic importance of the ACT amendments, as 
well as whether they translate into a meaningful increase in protection for animals. 
In this respect, the article contributes to the literature on animal law and welfare in 
that it critiques a novel development in the law’s recognition of animal sentience, 
                                                        
9 Note that as all provisions of the Animal Welfare Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (ACT) have 
commenced (at different times: s 2), that Act has been automatically repealed in accordance with the 
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 89(1). 
10 Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s 4A(1)(a) (‘AWA’). 
11 Ibid s 4A(1)(b). 
12 Bruce (n 5) 76–7. 
13 Ibid 77. 
14 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (‘Acts Interpretation Act’). 
15 AWA (n 10) s 6A. 
16 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ) long title (‘AWANZ’). 
17 Animal Welfare and Safety Act, CQLR 2016, c B-3.1, preamble (‘AWSA (Quebec)’). 
18 See Part IV of this article below.  
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which to date is ‘nebulous’ and lacks ‘scholarly conceptualization’.19 The article 
argues that the ACT amendments constitute a positive step in animal protection and 
that other Australian jurisdictions should consider incorporating similar provisions 
into their own animal protection legislation. Nevertheless, increased legal protection 
is required. 
In light of animal sentience and public concern for animals, this article argues 
that the ACT amendments fall short in terms of providing meaningful protection for 
animals from cruelty inflicted by humans. This is because the AWA (and equivalent 
state and territory legislation) excludes conduct that is in accordance with an 
approved code of practice or mandatory code of practice relating to animal welfare 
from the scope of its anti-cruelty obligations,20 significantly limiting the contexts in 
which many animals are protected by the law. Moreover, it is usually human needs 
and wants that determine whether conduct that causes pain to animals is 
‘unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable’.21 In this respect, what legislation 
proscribes in one circumstance may be permissible in another if the relevant animal 
is used to produce goods like milk or leather.22 
Part II of this article examines the contextual background to the ACT 
amendments. Part III considers the ACT amendments’ parliamentary history and 
substantive content. Part IV provides an analysis of the significance of these 
legislative amendments, with respect to their symbolic importance and ability to 
provide meaningful increases in protection for animals. In Part V, the article makes 
recommendations for the reform of animal protection laws both in the ACT and in 
other Australian jurisdictions. The recommendations made in the article are 
summarised in the concluding remarks in Part VI. 
II Background to the ACT Amendments 
A The Animal Advocacy Movement 
Animal advocacy has flourished over the last 50 years, particularly following the 
publication of Peter Singer’s text, Animal Liberation, in 1975.23 At the same time, 
pronounced differences in ideology between people within the animal advocacy 
movement have become apparent. The main division is between those advocating 
animal rights and those advocating improvements to animal welfare. In this respect, 
animal rights advocates challenge the legitimacy of human use of animals, and seek 
fundamental rights for animals.24 For example, Francione argues that animals need 
only one right, ‘the right not to be treated as the property of humans’,25 and that 
                                                        
19 Charlotte Blattner, ‘The Recognition of Animal Sentience by the Law’ (2019) 9(2) Journal of Animal 
Ethics 121, 122. 
20 AWA (n 10) s 20. 
21 Ibid s 6A; Bruce (n 5) 208. 
22 Bruce (n 5) 208. 
23 Kotzmann and Pendergrast (n 8) 158. 
24 Ibid 159. 
25 Gary L Francione, ‘One Right for All’, New Scientist (Web Page, 5 October 2005) 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18825205-100-one-right-for-all/>. 
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‘vegan education’ is the best way to work towards this goal.26 In contrast, welfare 
advocates argue that when ‘humans use animals for their own ends’, animals are 
entitled to minimum living conditions.27 For example, welfare advocates might 
support banning sow stalls, but not challenge the right of humans to raise and kill 
pigs for human consumption. Animal welfare ideology thus represents an attempt to 
strike a balance between human interests in using animals and animal interests in 
living happily and healthily. In contrast, animal rights ideology asserts that animal 
interests in a good life should outweigh any human interests in using animals. The 
colossal failure of animal welfare laws to protect animals from human harm together 
with the inherent strength of rights protections compared with welfare protections 
support a conclusion that legal rights are more likely to protect animals from human 
harm.28 Accordingly, this article adopts the animal rights framework as the 
normative yardstick against which to assess changes to animal law. 
It may be asked where the legal recognition of animal sentience sits within 
the context of this ideological spectrum. In this respect, it is clear that legally 
recognising animal sentience will not prevent humans continuing to use animals in 
various ways and will not change the legal status of animals as property.29 
Nevertheless, legally recognising animal sentience may achieve other objectives.  
In particular, recognising that animals are capable of experiencing feelings may lead 
to a reduction in animal suffering caused by humans and a strengthening of legal 
protection for animals. It might also better reflect community sentiment in relation 
to how humans should treat animals and provide a scientific foundation to animal 
welfare laws. Further, legal changes have the potential to improve public awareness 
and thus generate further change. This article evaluates the likely actual impact of 
the recognition of animal sentience in the ACT amendments.30 
B Animal Sentience in Science 
One of the notable aspects of the ACT amendments is that they make the ACT the 
first Australian state or territory to explicitly recognise animal sentience in the law. 
Scientists generally use sentience as a concept that refers to the capacity to have 
feelings.31 In this respect, feelings may include sensations like pain, as well as 
emotional responses like fear, suffering, happiness and joy.32 A sentient being may 
also have more complex features including having some ability ‘to evaluate the 
actions of others in relation to itself and third parties, to remember some of its own 
                                                        
26 Gary L Francione, ‘The Abolition of Animal Exploitation’ in Gary L Francione and Robert Garner, 
The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? (Columbia University Press, 2010) 64−5, 71; 
Kotzmann and Pendergrast (n 8) 171. 
27 Kotzmann and Pendergrast (n 8) 166. 
28 Ibid 182. 
29 See Part IV(F)(1) of this article below. 
30 See Parts IV–V of this article below. 
31 Donald M Broom, ‘Considering Animals’ Feelings’ (2016) 5(1) Animal Sentience 1, 2.  
32 Donald M Broom, Sentience and Animal Welfare (Cabi, 2014) 20; David Degrazia, ‘The Ethics of 
Animal Research: What Are the Prospects for Agreement?’ (1999) 8(1) Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 23, 26. 
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actions and their consequences, to assess risks and benefits, to have some feelings, 
and to have some degree of awareness’.33 
While there has been a recent global trend towards the express legal 
recognition of animal sentience,34 there has been scientific consensus for some time 
that many animals are sentient.35 In particular, there is general agreement that 
vertebrate animals are sentient.36 Scientific research indicates that parrots, dogs, 
pigs, cattle, other farm animals, companion animals, laboratory animals, wild 
mammals and birds are sentient.37 Further, studies in relation to amphibians, reptiles, 
fish, cephalopods and crustaceans indicate that they are sentient.38 There is even the 
suggestion that snails may be sentient.39 
C Public Concern for the Wellbeing of Animals 
Growing public concern in relation to the wellbeing of animals prompted, at least in 
part, the ACT amendments.40 This concern stems from increasing awareness of the 
extent of animal sentience, as well as increased media attention directed towards 
animal welfare, which has exposed the environments and practices to which sentient 
animals are often subject.41 In this respect, critics argue that animals require greater 
protections than welfare laws generally provide.42 For example, laws often permit 
animals used for food to be: subject to painful procedures that may be undertaken 
                                                        
33 Academic Press (n 2). 
34 See, eg, Animals Act 2011 (Netherlands) art 1.3; Code Civil [Civil Code] (France) art 515–14; Animal 
Welfare Act 2008 (Tanzania) s 4(b)(i); AWSA (Quebec) (n 17) preamble; Civil Code 2016 (Colombia) 
art 655; AWANZ (n 16) long title; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for 
signature 13 December 2007, [2012] OJ C 326/01 (entered into force 1 December 2009) art 13 
(‘TFEU’); Donald M Broom, ‘Animal Welfare and Legislation’ in Frans J M Smulders and Bo Algers 
(eds), Welfare of Production Animals: Assessment and Management of Risks (Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, 2009) 339, 339. 
35 Broom, Sentience and Animal Welfare (n 32) 127; Proctor, Carder and Cornish (n 1) 882; Proctor (n 1) 
628; Marc Bekoff, ‘Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate Natures’ (2000) 50(10) BioScience 861. 
36 Robert C Jones, ‘Science, Sentience, and Animal Welfare’ (2013) 28(1) Biology & Philosophy 1, 6. 
37 Broom, ‘Considering Animals’ Feelings’ (n 31) 8. 
38 Ibid; Jones (n 36) 6–8. 
39 Broom, ‘Considering Animals’ Feelings’ (n 31) 8. 
40 See ‘Consultation on the Exposure Draft of the Animal Welfare Legislation Amendment Bill 2019’, 
ACT Legislation Register (online) <https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/DownloadFile/ca/db_59376/ 
current/PDF/db_59376.PDF> 3; Futureye (n 8) 4; Responsible Investment Association Australasia, 
From Values to Riches: Charting Consumer Attitudes and Demand for Responsible Investing in 
Australia (Report, November 2017) 9. See also Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport and Resources (Vic), Animal Welfare Action Plan: Improving the Welfare of Animals in 
Victoria (Report, 2018) 12, which showed that 75% of respondents were of the view that animals 
should be better protected by the law: cited in Sentencing Advisory Council (Vic), Animal Cruelty 
Offences in Victoria (Report, February 2019) 1. 
41 Futureye (n 8) 4; Donald M Broom, ‘Animal Welfare in the European Union’ (Research Paper, 
European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, January 
2017) 9. 
42 See, eg, Siobhan O’Sullivan and Dinesh Wadiwel, ‘We Have Animal Welfare Laws but They Don’t 
Stop the Suffering’, The Conversation (online, 21 August 2014) <https://theconversation.com/we-
have-animal-welfare-laws-but-they-dont-stop-the-suffering-30703>. 
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without anaesthetic43 (including debeaking,44 dehorning,45 tail docking,46 
castration47 and hot branding);48 kept in restrictive conditions (such as battery 
cages49 and sow stalls50); deprived of natural light;51 and killed using painful or 
violent methods. Animals used for other purposes including entertainment,52 
experimentation,53 companionship,54 and animals that live in the wild,55 are also 
subject to practices that have been criticised on the basis of their perceived cruelty. 
Some countries have amended existing legislation or passed new legislation, 
including prohibitions on some of these practices, in order to address an increased 
concern for animal welfare and to better protect animals. It is notable that several 
countries and regions have recently passed laws that explicitly recognise that 
animals are sentient beings. These countries and regions include the European Union 
(‘EU’) in 2008,56 France in 2014,57 Quebec in 2015,58 New Zealand in 2015,59 and 
Colombia in 2016.60 
Government consultation in relation to the ACT amendments showed that most 
people consulted supported the proposed Animal Welfare Legislation Amendment Bill 
                                                        
43 Note that this is the case under both the Model Codes of Practice (see below nn 44–6, 48) and the 
Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines. At present, the Model Codes of Practice for 
the Welfare of Animals are being updated and replaced by the Australian Animal Welfare Standards 
and Guidelines: ‘Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines’, Department of Agriculture, 
Water and the Environment (Cth) (Web Page, 4 February 2020) <https://www.agriculture.gov.au/ 
animal/welfare/standards-guidelines>. 
44 See Primary Industries Standing Committee, Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: 
Domestic Poultry (CSIRO Publishing, 4th ed, 2002) 17 cl 12.5 (‘Poultry MCOP’). 
45 See Primary Industries Standing Committee, Parliament of Australia, Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Cattle (CSIRO Publishing, 2nd ed, 2004) 19 cl 5.8 (‘Cattle MCOP’). 
46 See Primary Industries Standing Committee, Parliament of Australia, Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Pigs (CSIRO Publishing, 3rd ed, 2008) 14 cl 5.6.10 (‘Pigs MCOP’). 
47 Cattle MCOP (n 45) 17 cl 5.4. 
48 See Animal Health Australia, Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Cattle (1st ed, 
2014) 19–20. 
49 See Poultry MCOP (n 44) 25–6 (appendix). 
50 See Pigs MCOP (n 46) 23. 
51 Poultry MCOP (n 44) 17 cl 12.5. 
52 Bruce (n 5) ch 7; Jackson Walkden-Brown, ‘Animals and Entertainment’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven 
White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 129, 129; 
Dominique Thiriet, ‘Out of Eden: Wild Animals and the Law’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and 
Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 226, 235–8. 
53 Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne, Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm 
Change (Brill, 2019); Elisa Galgut, ‘Raising the Bar in the Justification of Animal Research’ (2015) 
5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 5. 
54 Tony Bogdanoski, ‘A Companion Animal’s Worth: The Only “Family Member” Still Regarded as Legal 
Property’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia 
(Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 84, 84; Steven White, ‘Companion Animals: Members of the Family or 
Legally Discarded Objects?’ (2009) 32(3) University of New South Wales (UNSW) Law Journal 852. 
55 Thiriet (n 52) 226; Keely Boom and Dror Ben-Ami, ‘Shooting Our Wildlife: An Analysis of the Law 
and Its Animal Welfare Outcomes for Kangaroos & Wallabies’ (2011) 5 Australian Animal 
Protection Law Journal 44. 
56 TFEU (n 34) art 13. 
57 Code Rural et de la Peche Maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] (France) art L214–1. 
58 Bill 54, An Act to Improve the Legal Situation of Animals, 1st session, 41st Leg, Quebec, 2015, s 1. 
59 AWANZ (n 16). 
60 Ley No 1774 de 2016 (Colombia) art 665. 
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2019 (ACT) (‘Amendment Bill’).61 The consultation took place from December 2018 
to February 2019 and involved 120 individuals and 21 businesses and organisations. 
Feedback generally showed a ‘very high degree of support’ for recognising that 
animals are sentient and accordingly merit a quality of life and universal support for 
amendments to the law in order to better protect animals.62 
D Animal Welfare Laws in Australia 
The legal status of animals facilitates the manner in which humans have treated 
them. Animals have historically been categorised as property in the same manner 
that furniture or vehicles are characterised as property.63 Since they are legal 
property, owners of animals can buy and sell them, force them to work and 
generally treat them as they see fit (subject to welfare laws, discussed below).64 
However, given that animals are sentient in a way that other forms of personal 
property are not, the categorisation of animals as property has been cause for 
concern and society has become increasingly uneasy with this aspect of law.65 
Indeed, it is notable that animals are the only sentient beings that continue to be 
categorised as property in law.66 
All Australian states and territories have enacted laws that seek to protect 
some animals from exploitation,67 in accordance with the prevailing ethic that 
animals are sentient beings deserving of protection.68 Generally, animal welfare 
legislation operates to criminalise human conduct towards animals that would cause 
an animal unnecessary pain or suffering, and to impose positive duties of care on the 
owners or persons who are in charge of animals. Such legal protections limit the 
ways in which humans can use and derive benefit from animals, but do not grant 
animals themselves legal rights. 
                                                        
61 Transport Canberra and City Services (n 8). 
62 Ibid 3. See also Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 May 
2019, 1809 (Chris Steel, Minister for City Services) (‘May 2019 Speech’).  
63 Geeta Shyam, ‘Is the Classification of Animals as Property Consistent with Modern Community 
Attitudes?’ (2018) 41(4) University of New South Wales (UNSW) Law Journal 1418, 1418; Steven 
White, ‘Exploring Different Philosophical Approaches to Animal Protection in Law’ in Peter 
Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 
2013) 31, 31; James Gacek and Richard Jochelson, ‘“Animal Justice” and Sexual (Ab)use: 
Consideration of Legal Recognition of Sentience for Animals in Canada’ (2017) 40(3) Manitoba Law 
Journal 337, 339; Richard L Cupp Jr, ‘Animals as More than “Mere Things,” But Still Property:  
A Call for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm’ (2016) 84(4) University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1023, 1026, 1028. 
64 Bruce (n 5) 76−7; Gacek and Jochelson (n 63) 339. 
65 Broom, ‘Animal Welfare in the European Union’ (n 41) 35; Cupp (n 63) 1027; Shyam (n 63) 1418. 
66 Gacek and Jochelson (n 63) 339. Note that the law has treated slaves, women and children as property 
in the past. 
67 See AWA (n 10); NSW Act (n 6); Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NT); Animal Care and Protection Act 
2001 (Qld); Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA); Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas); Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals Act 1986 (Vic); Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA). In relation to Codes of Practice, see 
Arnja Dale and Steven White, ‘Codifying Animal Welfare Standards – Foundations for Better 
Animal Protection or Merely a Façade?’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), 
Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 151, 151–6. 
68 Steven White, ‘Standards and Standard-Setting in Companion Animal Protection’ (2016) 38(4) 
Sydney Law Review 463, 463. 
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E The Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) Framework 
The AWA is similar to animal protection legislation in operation in other Australian 
states and territories. The AWA applies to a broad range of animals, comprising 
various vertebrate species, including amphibians, birds, fish, mammals (other than 
human beings), as well as reptiles, cephalopods and crustaceans intended for human 
consumption.69 
Part 2 of the AWA criminalises a range of human conduct in relation to 
animals. Such conduct includes: failure by a person in charge of an animal to fulfil 
a duty of care to the animal, such as failing to provide appropriate food and water;70 
cruelty or aggravated cruelty to animals;71 failure by a person who injures an animal 
to take reasonable steps to assist with the animal’s injury;72 administering electric 
shock to an animal in an unauthorised manner;73 transporting or containing an animal 
in a way that causes the animal unnecessary injury, pain or suffering;74 carrying a 
dog unrestrained in a moving vehicle on a road or road-related area;75 and carrying 
out a medical or surgical procedure on an animal where the person undertaking the 
procedure is not a veterinary practitioner or where the procedure is not for an 
authorised purpose.76 
A key distinction between the AWA and legislation in other Australian 
jurisdictions is the prohibitions on particular conduct towards animals in ss 9, 9A, 
9B and 9C. In this respect, s 9 creates offences for confining an animal where that 
confinement causes or is likely to cause injury, pain or death to the animal;77  
an owner confining an animal where the animal is not able to move in a way that is 
appropriate;78 and a person in charge of an animal confining the animal in or on a 
vehicle where such confinement causes or is likely to cause the animal injury, pain, 
stress or death.79 Section 9A criminalises the keeping of laying fowls for commercial 
egg production in battery cages, as they fail to meet the conditions in the Eggs 
(Labelling and Sale) Regulation 2019 (ACT).80 Similarly, s 9B criminalises the 
keeping of pigs in sow stalls. Finally, s 9C criminalises the removal or trimming of 
a fowl’s beak. 
Pursuant to s 20 of the AWA, however, the anti-cruelty provisions described 
above do not apply if the conduct the subject of the alleged offence was in accordance 
with an approved code of practice or a mandatory code of practice. There are some 
exceptions to this provision, including the prohibitions in ss 9A, 9B and 9C, which 
                                                        
69 Note only ‘live’ animals are included within the definition: AWA (n 10) Dictionary (definition of 
‘animal’). 
70 Ibid s 6B. 
71 Ibid ss 7, 7A. 
72 Ibid s 10. 
73 Ibid s 13. 
74 Ibid s 15. 
75 Ibid s 15A. 
76 Ibid ss 19, 19A. 
77 Ibid s 9(1)(b). 
78 Ibid s 9(2)(b). 
79 Ibid ss 9(4)(a)–(b). 
80 Ibid s 9A(1)–(3). 
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impose strict liability. Nevertheless, these exemptions operate to remove animals that 
are the subject of codes of practice — generally farmed animals — from the reach of 
most anti-cruelty provisions. 
The ACT Minister for City Services, Chris Steel, introduced the Amendment 
Bill into the Legislative Assembly of the ACT Parliament on 16 May 2019.81 The 
Bill was developed in line with the Labor Government’s Animal Welfare and 
Management Strategy 2017–22, which acknowledges that animals are ‘sentient 
beings’ and seeks to ensure a consistent approach to promoting improved animal 
welfare outcomes.82 The amendments contained in the Amendment Bill continued 
the ACT’s approach of enacting progressive animal welfare reforms.83 
III The ACT Amendments 
A Parliamentary History 
Reference to the Hansard record of parliamentary discussion regarding the 
Amendment Bill shows that the ACT Parliament considers the recognition of animal 
sentience in legislation to be a very significant change.84 Chris Steel, the Minister 
for City Services, Australian Labor Party, stated that the ‘[B]ill reflects [animals’] 
… intrinsic value’.85 Caroline Le Couteur, for the Greens, referred to the change as 
‘a great step forward’.86 In particular, her statement revealed that the Greens see the 
amendments as a change in the way that humans see animals, a better relationship 
between humans and other species on the earth, a critical step towards that improved 
relationship and a recognition that humans have ‘rights and responsibilities’ with 
regards to animals.87 The statement from Nicole Lawder, for the Liberal Party, 
indicated that the Liberals see the change as a shift away from the categorisation of 
animals as property:  
I must confess that, in some ways, this was something I had to grapple with, 
because the law and our community have historically treated animals as 
property, and sentience and reason were reserved for humans. This [B]ill 
challenges the norm, and it is natural that we should question and be cautious 
about such a big step in our legislative framework.88 
It is also evident that the ACT Parliament sees the legal recognition of 
sentience as both reflective of community opinion and in step with global legislative 
changes. In parliamentary debate, Labor emphasised the extensive community 
consultation process and the high level of community support for the legal 
                                                        
81 Steel, May 2019 Speech (n 62) 1806. 
82 Naomi Maxwell, Animal Welfare and Management Strategy 2017–2022 (Transport Canberra and 
City Services Directorate, ACT Government, 2016) 5. 
83 For example, banning battery cages and sow stalls.  
84 Part IIIB discusses other noteworthy changes contained in the Animal Welfare Legislation 
Amendment Act 2019 (ACT) (n 9). 
85 Steel, May 2019 Speech (n 62) 1806. 
86 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2019, 
3945 (Caroline Le Couteur). 
87 Ibid 3945–6. 
88 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2019, 
3948–9 (Nicole Lawder). 
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recognition of animal sentience.89 Tara Cheyne, for Labor, indicated that the change 
would be reflective of community values, and that ‘leading jurisdictions around the 
world are moving towards recognising the sentience of animals in their legislation’.90 
Chris Steel also noted the international trend towards legal recognition of animal 
sentience.91 
Of particular interest is that at least some members of the ACT Parliament 
see recognition of animal sentience as providing a tangible and not just symbolic 
change. For example, Tara Cheyne (Labor) asserted that the change would enable 
the AWA ‘to provide for the physical and mental wellbeing of animals’.92 Nicole 
Lawder (Liberal) intimated that the change means that the legislation ‘considers the 
mental as well as the physical wellbeing of animals’.93 Similarly, Chris Steel (Labor) 
indicated that recognising the sentience of animals would enable the legislation to 
‘account for the proven fact that animals are not objects but instead beings capable 
of feeling emotion and pain’.94 
Section 4A(1)(c) of the Amendment Bill, which stated that ‘people have a 
duty to care for the physical and mental welfare of animals’, created discord in the 
ACT Parliament. Nicole Lawder (Liberal) moved to amend the clause on the basis 
that the phrase ‘duty of care’ has significant meaning in the law and thus ‘[s]ection 
4A(1)(c) in its current unqualified form could potentially be interpreted as 
prohibitive against many acceptable, responsible, humane and common 
environmental, commercial and recreational activities’.95 Accordingly, she proposed 
amendments that expressly recognised practices in particular contexts as not being 
limited by s 4A(1)(a).96 The proposed amendments were not successful.97 Chris Steel 
(Labor) indicated that the amendments would make s 4 more ambiguous and ‘could 
be seen to limit … sentience’.98 Caroline Le Couteur (Greens) did not support the 
amendments on the basis that the Greens would like to see change to some practices 
in these areas.99 Thus, it seems clear that the ACT Parliament’s intention is that the 
recognition of sentience in s 4A(1)(a) applies to all animals.100 This conclusion is 
supported by the Revised Explanatory Statement for the Bill, which states that  
                                                        
89 Steel, May 2019 Speech (n 62) 1809. See also Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2019, 3955 (Chris Steel, Minister for City Services) 
(‘September 2019 Speech’). 
90 Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2019, 
3950 (Tara Cheyne). 
91 Steel, September 2019 Speech (n 89) 3952. 
92 Cheyne (n 90) 3951 (emphasis added). 
93 Lawder (n 88) 3948. 
94 Steel, September 2019 Speech (n 89) 3952. 
95 Lawder (n 88) 3957. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid 3958. 
98 Steel, September 2019 Speech (n 89) 3957. 
99 Le Couteur (n 86) 3957. 
100 Note that the Liberal Party also proposed amendments in relation to the Amendment Bill s 18. These 
amendments were similarly rejected on the basis that they might make the provision more ambiguous 
and might restrict the application of the AWA: Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2019, 3959–61 (Chris Steel, Nicole Lawder and Caroline Le 
Couteur). 
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s 4A aims to mirror community values in relation to animal welfare ‘and the proper 
treatment of all animals’.101 
B Substance of the ACT Amendments 
The ACT amendments aimed to recognise animals as sentient beings, and bolster 
animal welfare protections.102 The amendments comprised significant changes to the 
AWA’s objects, which are set out in s 4A (as amended) as follows: 
(1) The main objects of this Act are to recognise that— 
(a) animals are sentient beings that are able to subjectively feel and 
perceive the world around them; and 
(b) animals have intrinsic value and deserve to be treated with 
compassion and have a quality of life that reflects their intrinsic 
value; and 
(c) people have a duty to care for the physical and mental welfare of 
animals. 
(2) This is to be achieved particularly by— 
(a) promoting and protecting the welfare of animals; and 
(b) providing for the proper and humane care, management and 
treatment of animals; and 
(c) deterring and preventing animal cruelty and the abuse and neglect 
of animals; and 
(d) enforcing laws about the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b) 
and (c). 
Thus, as noted, the amendments are particularly significant in that they make the 
ACT the first Australian jurisdiction to explicitly recognise animal sentience in the 
law.103 According to the Responsible Minister, Chris Steel, this means that: 
[W]e as a community accept that animals are sentient beings with intrinsic 
value that can feel pain and emotions and are deserving of an acceptable 
quality of life. This is based on science and recognises that modern animal 
welfare is about considering how an animal is coping mentally and physically 
with the conditions in which it lives.104 
The amendments to the objects also operate to expressly acknowledge that 
people have a duty of care to look after both the physical and mental welfare of 
animals. While the legislation, prior to the ACT amendments, already set out a duty 
to care for animals,105 the ACT amendments to the objects strengthen and widen the 
scope of this duty. 
                                                        
101 Revised Explanatory Statement, Animal Welfare Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (ACT) 12 
(emphasis added). 
102 Steel, May 2019 Speech (n 62) 1806. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 AWA (n 10) s 6B. 
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Many of the other ACT amendments are also noteworthy. The amendments 
aim to make the ACT ‘a national leader in animal welfare’.106 In this respect, a 
number of amendments operate to broaden and strengthen existing protections. For 
example, the amending legislation broadened the AWA s 6A definition of what 
constitutes cruelty by changing the definition from causing pain that is ‘unjustifiable, 
unnecessary or unreasonable’ to ‘doing, or not doing’ something that ‘causes, or is 
likely to cause, injury, pain, stress or death … that is unjustifiable, unnecessary or 
unreasonable’.107 Thus, the definition of cruelty now encompasses the failure of a 
person to prevent unnecessary pain or the likelihood of unnecessary pain. Similarly, 
the duty of care of a person in charge of an animal set out in s 6B has been expanded 
and strengthened. A range of additional strict liability offences relating to failure to 
provide an animal with water or shelter, failure to provide animal with a hygienic 
environment, failing to properly groom and maintain an animal, failing to exercise a 
dog, and abandoning an animal supplement this duty of care.108 The amendments 
also increase the penalties for a range of offences under the AWA.109 
The ACT amendments also aim to achieve more effective law enforcement. 
For example, under s 6, the amendments broaden the power of the Animal Welfare 
Authority to delegate its functions. Part 7 of the AWA establishes an ‘escalating 
enforcement framework’110 to try to prevent further animal cruelty events occurring. 
As part of this escalating framework, the Animal Welfare Authority has the power 
to make interim prohibition orders to prevent individuals from being in charge of an 
animal for a period.111 Further, the Animal Welfare Authority has been granted the 
power to seize, retain, sell, rehome or destroy (where necessary) seized animals.112 
IV The Significance of the ACT Amendments 
A Introduction 
This section discusses the potential impact of the legal recognition of animal 
sentience in the ACT. In doing so, it draws on the experience of the EU, New 
Zealand and Quebec, which also recognise sentience in their animal welfare 
legislation. A small sample of cases provides the foundation for this discussion. This 
is because the legislative amendments in New Zealand and Quebec are very recent 
and, accordingly, there has been little relevant case law in those jurisdictions. The 
EU provisions have been in place for a longer period, however, and, as discussed 
below, the EU has a quite distinct legal framework and the provisions are somewhat 
different in nature to the ACT legislative recognition of animal sentience. 
                                                        
106 Chris Steel (Minister for City Services, ACT Government), ‘Bill Passed to Strengthen Animal Welfare 
Standards’ (Media Release, 26 September 2019) <https://www.cmtedd.act.gov.au/open_government/ 
inform/act_government_media_releases/chris-steel-mla-media-releases/2019/bill-passed-to-
strengthen-animal-welfare-standards>. 
107 AWA (n 10) s 6A (emphasis added). 
108 Ibid ss 6C–6G. ‘Strict liability’ means that there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements 
of the offence: Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 23(1)(a). 
109 AWA (n 10) ss 7 (‘cruelty to animals’), 7A(1)–(2) (‘aggravated cruelty to animals’). 
110 Steel (n 107). 
111 Ibid s 86E. 
112 Ibid ss 81A, 83A, 86C–86D. 
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The EU has legally recognised animal sentience for some time. In 1997, a 
protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam (‘Treaty of Amsterdam’) referred to animals as 
‘sentient beings’.113 In 2006, the Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and included an explicit recognition 
of animal sentience in the form of art 13.114 The recognition of sentience in both the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the TFEU relates to ‘[a]ll animals used by people’.115 
The TFEU does not define the term ‘sentient’ and it is unclear why it was 
explicitly included.116 While the EU’s brochure on its Animal Welfare Strategy 
2012–15 states that recognising animals as sentient beings means that ‘they are 
capable of feeling pleasure and pain’,117 at the time of drafting, there was little 
discussion as to the reasons for including TFEU art 13.118 Contextually, however, 
the inclusion of a recognition of animal sentience fits in with the historical 
background of a growing concern for animal welfare and thus appears to constitute 
recognition of the importance of animal interests.119 From 1974, the EU began 
introducing directives in relation to animal welfare.120 Political developments have 
also demonstrated an increasing concern for animal welfare.121 
In 2015, New Zealand amended the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ) 
(‘AWANZ’) to recognise animal sentience.122 The AWANZ is the primary legislation 
relating to the welfare of animals in New Zealand, and sets out how people should 
and should not interact with animals and the obligations people have towards 
animals.123 The AWANZ covers a wide range of animals, including mammals, birds, 
reptiles, amphibians, fish, octopus, squid, crab, lobster, and crayfish, but excludes 
humans.124 The long title of the AWANZ was amended to state that the AWANZ is 
intended ‘to reform the law relating to the welfare of animals and the prevention of 
their ill-treatment; and … to recognise that animals are sentient’.125 While the term 
                                                        
113 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, opened for signature 2 October 1997, [1997] OJ 
C 340/1 (entered into force 1 May 1999) (‘Treaty of Amsterdam’) Protocol on Protection and Welfare 
of Animals. 
114 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, opened for signature 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/1 (entered into force  
1 December 2009) art 13; ‘Animal Welfare’, European Commission (Web Page) <https://ec.europa. 
eu/food/animals/welfare_en>. 
115 Broom, ‘Animal Welfare in the European Union’ (n 41) 47. 
116 Katy Sowery, ‘Sentient Beings and Tradable Products: The Curious Constitutional Status of Animals 
under Union Law’ (2018) 55(1) Common Market Law Review 55, 67. 
117 European Commission, EU Animal Welfare Strategy: 2012–2015, 1 <https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/ 
food/files/animals/docs/aw_brochure_strategy_en.pdf>. 
118 Sowery (n 116) 67. 
119 See Steven White, ‘Into the Void: International Law and the Protection of Animal Welfare’ (2013) 
4(4) Global Policy 391, 392. 
120 Council Directive 74/577/EEC of 18 November 1974 on Stunning of Animals before Slaughter [1974] 
OJ L 316/10 cited in Sowery (n 116) 62. 
121 Sowery (n 116) 64. 
122 Animal Welfare Amendment Act (No 2) 2015 (NZ) s 4. 
123 AWANZ (n 16) long title; Ministry for Primary Industries (NZ), ‘Animal Welfare’, Agriculture & 
Investment Services (Web Page, 3 August 2020) <https://www.mpi.govt.nz/law-and-policy/legal-
overviews/animal-welfare/>. 
124 AWANZ (n 16) s 2(1). 
125 Ibid long title (emphasis added). See also Marcelo B Rodriguez Ferrere, ‘Codes vs Regulations: How 
Best to Enforce Animal Welfare in New Zealand?’ (2018) 43(4) Alternative Law Journal 250, 252. 
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‘sentience’ is not defined in the AWANZ, it was referred to as meaning ‘that animals 
can have feelings, perceptions, and experiences that matter to them’ in the Minister 
for Primary Industry’s second reading speech.126 
Public consultation prompted the recognition of sentience in New Zealand 
law.127 The amendment Bill, as originally introduced, did not explicitly reference 
animal sentience. During the passage of the Bill, it was referred to the Primary 
Production Committee, which consulted with the public and subsequently 
recommended that animal sentience be expressly recognised.128 During consultation, 
the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee, animal advocacy groups — 
including the World Society for the Protection of Animals, Royal New Zealand 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and New Zealand Companion 
Animal Council — and a large number of private individuals and bodies made 
submissions recommending the inclusion of a concept of sentience in the 
amendment Bill.129 There were several reasons put forward for adding sentience to 
the Bill, including that recognising animal sentience is central to understanding how 
humans should treat animals, putting animal sentience beyond doubt, and 
maintaining New Zealand’s reputation as an international leader in animal 
welfare.130 Most submissions, however, ‘acknowledge[d] that the change proposed 
would be largely symbolic’.131 Nevertheless, the Minister for Primary Industries 
noted that recognising sentience in the preamble to the AWANZ might play an 
important role in influencing the future operation of the AWANZ, because of the 
relevance of sentience in interpreting provisions in the Act.132 
The legal recognition of animal sentience in the AWANZ has both similarities 
to, and differences from, the recognition in TFEU art 13. The AWANZ includes 
reference to sentience as an aspect of the purpose of the Act, which may influence 
interpretation of the Act’s provisions where a purposive approach to interpretation 
is applied.133 In this respect, New Zealand courts have used long titles when applying 
a purposive approach.134 Similarly, TFEU art 13 obliges Member States to pay 
regard to ‘the welfare requirements of animals’ in certain circumstances, because 
animals are sentient. Thus, the reference to sentience provides the purpose for the 
substantive obligation and may influence the interpretation of the substantive 
obligation. 
                                                        
126 (26 November 2014) 702 NZPD 898–9 (Animal Welfare Amendment Bill — Second Reading, Nathan 
Guy). See also Ministry for Primary Industries (NZ), Animal Welfare Amendment Bill: Issues Paper 
Developed by the Ministry for Primary Industries (Issues Paper, 5 December 2013) 8 
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127 Guy (n 126) 898–9. 
128 Ibid 898. 
129 Ministry for Primary Industries (NZ) (n 126) 6. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid 8. 
132 Ibid 9. 
133 See Interpretation Act 1999 (NZ) s 5(1). 
134 JF Burrows, Statute Law in New Zealand (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2003) 166. 
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Quebec is the third jurisdiction considered here that has legally recognised 
animal sentience. On 4 December 2015, the General Assembly of Quebec passed 
Bill 54, An Act to Improve the Legal Situation of Animals.135 This Act amended the 
Civil Code of Quebec136 to formally recognise animals as sentient beings.137 
Accordingly, s 898.1 of the Civil Code of Quebec now stipulates that ‘[a]nimals are 
not things. They are sentient beings and have biological needs’. An Act to Improve 
the Legal Situation of Animals also operated to enact the Animal Welfare and Safety 
Act (‘AWSA (Quebec)’).138 Like the Civil Code of Quebec, the AWSA (Quebec) 
recognises that ‘animals are sentient beings that have biological needs’.139 While the 
Civil Code of Quebec and the AWSA (Quebec) recognise animal sentience, they do 
not grant rights to animals;140 indeed, s 898.1 of the Civil Code of Quebec explicitly 
indicates that laws concerning property continue to apply to animals. Further, while 
the AWSA (Quebec) imposes obligations of care and prohibitions against causing 
distress to animals, these protections do not extend to animals involved in 
agricultural activities, teaching activities, or scientific research undertaken in 
accordance with generally recognised rules.141 
While there are differences between the jurisdictions considered here, the 
relevant provisions bear striking resemblance to each other. In each jurisdiction, 
concern for animal welfare and a perceived need to improve legal protections for 
animals provided the context for legal recognition of animal sentience. In this 
respect, the sentience provisions were the product of domestic pressures, but also 
pressures that transcend individual jurisdictions. At the same time, it is not clear that 
explicit recognition of sentience in any of the jurisdictions has yet had any 
significant consequence for animals. 
B Tangible Consequences of Recognising Sentience 
The ACT amendments expressly recognise animal sentience, but do not clearly link 
this acknowledgment with any substantive obligation on humans to protect animals. 
It could be argued that the wording of s 4A links recognition of sentience to 
substantive obligations, for example, via the words ‘[t]his is to be achieved … by … 
promoting and protecting the welfare of animals’.142 This is, however, a tangential 
link. In this respect, it is similar to the amendments made to the AWANZ; the long 
title recognises animal sentience, but there is no link between the acknowledgement 
of sentience and a substantive obligation on humans in relation to their care for 
animals. Likewise, the legislative amendments passed in Quebec to recognise animal 
sentience have no link to a duty on humans to care for animals.143 
                                                        
135 Bill 54, An Act to Improve the Legal Situation of Animals (n 58). 
136 Civil Code of Quebec, CQLR c CCQ-1991 (‘Civil Code of Quebec’). 
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identified that the AWSA (Quebec) would be useful to determine what a pet care business’s duties 
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These provisions contrast with TFEU art 13, whose recognition of animal 
sentience provides the basis for the substantive obligation on the EU and its Member 
States to ‘pay full regard’ to animal welfare matters when formulating and 
implementing particular EU policies. In this respect, TFEU art 13 operates to create 
a linkage between sentience and animal welfare.144 In other words, TFEU art 13 
asserts that it is because animals are sentient that humans must consider animal 
welfare. This linkage is important because the way in which sentience is conceived, 
particularly in the absence of an explicit definition, affects how animal welfare is 
approached in EU law.145 To be clear, the reference to sentience in TFEU art 13 
alone does not create any legal obligation. It is instead included as justification for 
the legal obligation to ‘pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals’.146 
Masterrind GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas,147 decided in 2016, 
illustrates the operation of TFEU art 13. In that case, the Court stated that the aim of 
the relevant regulation was ‘to avoid transporting animals in a way likely to cause 
them injury or undue suffering’, and commented that ‘[t]his is in line with Article 13 
TFEU, according to which animals are sentient beings’.148 As a result, the Court held 
that TFEU art 13 required the EU and its Member States to pay full regard to animal 
welfare requirements in formulating and implementing agriculture policy.149 
Further, European Coalition to End Animal Experiments v European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA)150 illustrates the nature of the legal obligation to ‘pay full regard’.151 
The Court identified that the Board of the European Chemicals Agency was obliged, 
when making decisions, such as the contested decision to require a second species 
prenatal developmental toxicity study, to pay full regard to animal welfare 
requirements.152 
The link between TFEU art 13 and a substantive obligation to pay full regard 
to animal welfare requirements is commendable. However, the EU, to a greater 
extent than the ACT, New Zealand or Quebec, is limited in the matters on which it 
can legislate. In particular, animal welfare is not included as an area of competence 
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to legislate and adopt legally binding acts of the EU in arts 2–6 of the TFEU. Thus, 
while the protection of animal welfare is a ‘legitimate objective in the public 
interest’,153 the EU has no competence to adopt animal welfare standards in the 
absence of a relevant policy area, such as agriculture and fisheries.154 Thus, it would 
not be possible for the EU to adopt an animal welfare law, like that adopted in the 
other jurisdictions considered here, which criminalises human conduct towards 
animals or imposes broad duties on humans to care for animals. 
C Impact on Statutory Interpretation 
While the ACT sentience recognition is unlikely to have a significant impact in the 
substantive sense outlined above, it may have more influence through the processes 
of statutory interpretation. When courts interpret statutory provisions in order to give 
them meaning, and where there is more than one interpretation of a particular 
provision open to them, they are required to consider the purposes of the relevant 
legislation and give the provision the interpretation most in line with the legislative 
purposes.155 This is the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, and is 
common in many jurisdictions. 
In the context of the AWA, there are numerous provisions that courts may 
need to interpret. Perhaps one of the provisions most amenable to varying 
interpretations is the definition of cruelty set out in s 6A, which informs the 
prohibitions on cruelty and aggravated cruelty to animals set out in ss 7 and 7A. 
Here, conduct (or a failure to act) in relation to an animal is defined as cruelty only 
if it is ‘unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable in the circumstances’.156 The 
legislation does not define these terms, however, and they could be subject to 
numerous meanings.157 For example, does the conduct need to be unjustifiable from 
the perspective of a human or from the perspective of an animal? Is conduct 
necessary if it allows farmers to adopt more efficient farming practices even though 
the animal would be better off under other practices?158 In answering questions like 
these, courts will refer to the objects of the AWA, which now include a purpose to 
recognise that animals are sentient. It may be that reference to the objects will enable 
courts to take a more animal-centred approach to statutory interpretation. In 
particular, prosecutors and courts may give greater value to the estimation of each 
individual animal for the purposes of sentencing in criminal cases. In this respect, it 
is interesting to note that some United States’ courts are recognising animals as 
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crime victims for sentencing purposes, meaning that each animal that is subjected to 
abuse counts as a separate ‘victim’ of the crime.159 
Even so, relying on courts to interpret legislation in a way that is more 
favourable to animals is a slow way to improve protections for animals. Courts must 
wait for cases to come before them in which the parties ask them to consider issues 
of interpretation before they are able to undertake the statutory interpretation 
exercise. In Australia, magistrates’ courts decide most animal cruelty cases,160 and 
reasons for these decisions are not readily available; these factors make the potential 
for change via this pathway even slower. The paucity of case law from other 
jurisdictions in relation to legal recognition of animal sentience may be due, in part, 
to these issues. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence from other jurisdictions that animal 
sentience recognition can have influence through the processes of statutory 
interpretation. For example, the reference to animal sentience in TFEU art 13 may 
have assisted the interpretation of EU legislation in the case of Zuchtvieh-Export 
GmbH v Stadt Kempten.161 Zuchtvieh was concerned with whether animal welfare 
requirements relating to the transport of animals also apply to those parts of an 
international journey that take place outside of the EU. The European Court of 
Justice held that the relevant regulation should be interpreted generously, such that 
the EU animal welfare rules must be complied with even if the journey continues 
outside of the EU, so long as it commenced within the EU.162 TFEU art 13 grounds 
this interpretation. Moreover, EU case law establishes that ‘the protection of animal 
welfare is a legitimate objective in the public interest’.163 The European Court of 
Justice relies on TFEU art 13 as the foundation of this principle.164 Nevertheless, 
while TFEU art 13 has been influential in these instances, it is unclear the extent to 
which the express recognition of animal sentience, as opposed to the remainder of 
TFEU art 13, has contributed to this influence. 
In the New Zealand context, several cases have referenced the recognition 
of animal sentience in the long title of the AWANZ.165 Erickson v Ministry for 
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Primary Industries is a key case in this respect.166 Erickson concerned the violent 
conduct of a casually employed slaughterman towards bobby calves. The defendant 
pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him under ss 28(1)(d), 12(c), 
28A(1)(d), 29(a) and 12(a) of the AWANZ.167 Two of these charges related to the 
wilful treatment of a calf with the result that it was seriously injured or impaired, 
one charge related to killing a calf in such a manner that it suffered unreasonable 
or unnecessary pain or distress, two representative charges were brought for 
recklessly ill-treating calves with the result that they were seriously injured or 
impaired, four representative charges were brought for ill-treating calves and one 
representative charge was related to failing to meet the calves’ physical, health and 
behavioural needs.168 In its judgment, the Court of Appeal set out the considerations 
that determine the gravity of offending in cases of wilful and reckless ill-treatment 
of animals, with a view to giving assistance to sentencing courts when sentencing 
offenders for these types of crimes.169 
The Court of Appeal in Erickson stated that ‘[t]he primary purpose of the Act 
is stated in its title, parts of which read: … to recognise that animals are sentient’.170 
Yet the Court did not look at the long title in detail, but merely implied that one must 
have the purpose of the AWANZ in mind when interpreting it. Unfortunately, the 
Court did not explain how it applied the purpose when interpreting the relevant 
provisions in the particular circumstances of the case. Further, the Court also referred 
to pre-2015 amendment cases as precedent for determining the ‘gravity of the 
offending’.171 The discussion of these cases does not reference the 2015 
amendments, and thus it seems that explicit legal recognition of sentience did not 
influence a determination of the gravity of the offence under s 28. 
Police v Witehira172 and McCartney v Canterbury Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals173 also reference the recognition of animal sentience in the 
AWANZ.174 Witehira was concerned with sentencing the defendant for brutally 
bashing to death his son’s dog while he was under the influence of alcohol. The 
relevant charges were brought under s 28(1)(c) of the AWANZ.175 As the Court of 
Appeal did in Erickson, the District Court in Witehira noted the stated primary 
purpose of the AWANZ, including the recognition of animal sentience, yet failed to 
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explain how that purpose influenced its interpretation of provisions in the AWANZ.176 
The case of McCartney was also concerned with companion animals and a particular 
owner’s failure to euthanise one cat and to obtain appropriate medical treatment for a 
second cat.177 In its judgment, the New Zealand High Court acknowledged that the 
2015 amendments ‘recognised that animals are sentient’ and placed obligations upon 
their owners.178 As in Erickson and Witehira, however, it is not clear how this purpose 
influenced the High Court’s interpretation of the AWANZ’s provisions. 
Wallace v Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Auckland 
(SPCA Auckland)179 provides a more tangible example of how recognition of animal 
sentience may influence statutory interpretation of the AWANZ. Wallace and Glover 
were charged with offences under the AWANZ.180 Before the determination of those 
charges, the SPCA brought an application for disposal orders under the AWANZ in 
order to ‘sell, rehome or, as a last resort, euthanise the dogs’ the subject of the alleged 
offences.181 Wallace and Glover applied to stay or adjourn the application pending 
the resolution of the criminal charges.182 The District Court declined to grant an 
adjournment and the matter was appealed to the High Court.183 In affirming the 
District Court’s decision, the High Court identified the purpose of the disposal 
provision as including the prevention of negative impacts for animals, which it stated 
was appropriate for the purpose of the AWANZ as set out in its long title.184 In other 
words, the High Court used the purpose of the AWANZ, including recognition that 
animals are sentient, to support their interpretation of the disposal provision as 
including the avoidance of harm to animals. 
Recent case law in Quebec also provides some insight into how legislative 
recognition of animal sentience may influence statutory interpretation. In Trahan v 
Ville de Montréal,185 the Quebec Superior Court needed to determine whether the 
City of Montreal was required to consider the dog owner’s point of view before 
issuing a euthanasia order.186 The Court referred to the legislative recognition of the 
sentience of animals, which it said supported answering this question in the 
affirmative.187 Road to Home Rescue Support v Ville de Montréal provides further 
instruction.188 In that case, the Quebec Court of Criminal Appeal held that there is 
no incompatibility between provisions that permit the euthanasia of dangerous dogs 
and the recognition of sentience in s 898.1.189 In obiter dicta, the Court also indicated 
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that s 898.1 ‘has the value of a behavioural standard’ in that it should regulate the 
behaviour of those that interact with animals and may have a direct effect on the 
content of legal regulations.190 
D Sentience as a Tool for Advocacy 
In a recent study, Blattner identifies that the legal recognition of animal sentience 
effectively operates as a ‘gateway to according animals protection under the law’.191 
In other words, it must be shown that animals have sentience before they merit legal 
protection. This is not immediately obvious when looking at relevant legislation. 
Under the AWA, for example, the legislative objects are set out in s 4A, which 
includes the aim of recognising that animals are sentient beings. The dictionary at 
the end of the AWA defines ‘animal’ to include live vertebrates, cephalopods and 
crustaceans.192 In order to come within the scope of the AWA then, an animal needs 
to come within this definition, and does not need to demonstrate sentience. 
Nevertheless, the legislative reliance on the concept of sentience suggests that a 
species is only likely to be explicitly included within the scope of animal protection 
legislation if science establishes that it is sentient. 
The use of sentience as a gateway to the legal protection of animals has 
significant potential for animal advocates, and thus for improved levels of animal 
protection. This is because it recognises the intrinsic value of animals and bases it 
on a scientific criterion, as opposed to other potential criteria, like human use, human 
popularity or rationality.193 If animals are protected because they are sentient, then 
many of the exclusions and defences commonly found in animal protection laws are 
open to challenge.194 In short, animal advocates will be able to present compelling 
arguments that if animals are protected because they are sentient, then that protection 
should also be commensurate with their sentience. 
E Public Awareness and Further Change 
A further way in which legal recognition of animal sentience could improve the lives 
and treatment of animals is through its impact on public awareness and possible 
further resulting changes. The nature of the ACT amendments, as an Australian legal 
first and as part of a broader legal movement, means that the change has generated 
significant media attention. Mainstream news, internet, radio and academic writing 
provide commentary on the ACT amendments.195 This exposure is likely to increase 
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public awareness of the science in relation to animal sentience and the way in which 
some laws are changing to respond to that science. Increased awareness may 
generate change in the way people deal with and treat animals. 
The ACT amendments are likely to generate further legal changes in other 
Australian jurisdictions. The Northern Territory Social Policy Scrutiny Committee 
undertook the Inquiry into the Animal Protection Bill 2018 and in doing so, 
considered a number of submissions advocating for legal recognition of animal 
sentience.196 Nevertheless, the Committee decided not to recommend recognising 
animal sentience in the legislation, as they felt that it was already implicitly 
present.197 While there is some basis to this argument, express recognition of animal 
sentience does clarify, and thus elevate, the importance of animal mental states 
separate to the issue of physical harm to animals. Aside from the Northern Territory, 
Victoria is also currently reviewing its Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 
(Vic) and is expected to amend the Act to legally recognise animal sentience.198 
Further, Western Australia is also undertaking a review of their Animal Welfare Act 
2002 (WA) and has received submissions for the legal recognition of animal 
sentience.199 
F Limitations 
While legal recognition of animal sentience is a positive step forward for animal 
protection, this type of legal amendment fails to address aspects of animal welfare 
laws that leave animals vulnerable to human exploitation. This section discusses the 
deficiencies in the way that animal welfare laws address the human–animal 
relationship.200 
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1 The Legal Status of Animals 
While expressly recognising the sentience of animals in law suggests that the public 
perceives animals as sentient beings and not as objects, it fails to change the legal 
status of animals as property. In some jurisdictions, legislation expressly states the 
continuing application of property laws to animals. For example, in Quebec, while 
the Civil Code of Quebec and the AWSA (Quebec) recognise animal sentience, 
s 898.1 of the Civil Code of Quebec explicitly indicates that laws concerning 
property continue to apply to animals. In other jurisdictions, laws do not state that 
property laws will continue to apply to animals, and yet this is the case.201 In the 
ACT, for example, while the AWA acknowledges animal sentience, the common law 
property status of animals is unaffected, and statutory laws such as s 4 of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) continue to apply to animals. 
Under EU legislation animals are referred to as both ‘sentient beings’ and 
‘tradable products’, and thus according to Sowery hold a ‘dual status’.202 While EU 
law considers animals to be sentient beings (in keeping with popular sentiment and 
scientific advancements), they also remain agricultural products. For example, art 38 
of the TFEU defines agricultural products to include the products of stock farming 
and fisheries.203 Some EU legislation also describes animals merely as property.204 
The reformed EU Common Agricultural Policy instruments do not explicitly, or 
directly, aim to improve farm animal welfare.205 
Many animal advocates consider the property status of animals to be a 
significant obstacle to achieving genuine protection for animals.206 Francione, a 
leading animal rights advocate, argues that animals need only the right not to be 
treated as property.207 Similarly, the animal protection organisation, Voiceless, 
asserts that the property status of animals is ‘a key issue in their abuse and 
exploitation’.208 This is because the law frames property as ‘things’ that have no 
legal rights and no standing to challenge decisions made in relation to them. 
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2 Legal Representation and Standing for Animals 
Relatedly, expressly recognising animal sentience does not give rise to additional 
avenues for challenging decisions concerning animals via legal means. In order to 
bring an action in court, most jurisdictions require that the claimant have legal 
personality and standing to bring an action. However, property does not have legal 
personality or standing. Durand v Attorney General of Quebec, which concerned an 
attempt to bring a class action relating to electromagnetic field pollution, highlights 
this issue.209 The plaintiffs sought to bring a class action, including ‘flora, fauna, pets 
and animals’ as class members.210 The Court stated that s 898.1 of the Civil Code of 
Quebec ‘does not grant status as class members to flora, fauna, pets or animals’.211 
It explained that while the Civil Code provides that ‘animals are not things’, they 
can still be property.212 This, the Court said, was ‘not indicative of being qualified 
to be a class member’.213 
This issue extends beyond the capacity of animals themselves to bring legal 
action, to both the capacity of animals to have their interests represented by people, 
and the capacity of people with an interest in animals to have standing in a particular 
case. For example, in the EU, it is clear that TFEU art 13 does not introduce any 
entitlement for legal representation of animals’ interests. European Coalition, 
decided in 2015, concerned a challenge to a decision made to retest a particular 
chemical on rabbits.214 The key issue for the Court was whether the European 
Coalition to End Animal Experiments, an animal welfare group, had standing to 
bring the proceeding. The Court decided that the applicant did not meet any of the 
relevant standing requirements and, in particular, that the contested decision did not 
directly affect the applicant’s legal position.215 While the applicant argued that a 
refusal to grant standing would mean that the interests of the laboratory animals 
would be unrepresented, this was insufficient to grant standing. Thus, while the 
TFEU recognises animals as sentient beings, such recognition does not create new 
or additional rights to have animals’ interests legally represented. 
In Australia, there is limited scope for animals to have their interests 
represented before the law. Following the case of Australian Conservation 
Foundation Inc v Commonwealth,216 a person or organisation wishing to challenge 
a decision must have a ‘special interest’ in the matter, which is more than a ‘mere 
intellectual or emotional concern’.217 Unfortunately, an interest in the protection of 
animals and prevention of cruelty alone ‘does not constitute a special interest’.218 
Nevertheless, a court may grant standing to an animal protection group that is able 
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to show some of the features that can indicate a special interest.219 This was the case 
in Animals’ Angels eV v Secretary, Department of Agriculture,220 where a variety of 
factors, including recognition by the Government, led to the Court granting the 
animal protection group Animals’ Angels standing to challenge governmental 
decisions in relation to a live export voyage. While this limited scope for the legal 
representation of animal interests exists, however, there is no indication that the legal 
recognition of animal sentience in legislation will give rise to expanded or additional 
avenues for challenging decisions concerning animals via legal means. 
3 Human Cultural and Religious Rights 
Further, acknowledging animal sentience in the law does not mean that decisions 
that have consequences for animals will always seek to minimise animal pain and 
suffering. In particular, where there is a conflict between human cultural and 
religious rights and the welfare interests of animals, it is likely that human interests 
will prevail. Reference to TFEU art 13 demonstrates this point. Pursuant to that 
provision, the recognition of animal sentience and the associated legal obligation to 
‘pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals’ must be balanced with 
respect for other legislative provisions, and for customs, including religious rites, 
cultural traditions and regional heritage.221 While animals may suffer less, for 
example, if they are stunned before slaughter, respect for religious rites that require 
slaughter by cutting through the jugular, carotid artery and windpipe while the 
animal is alive and healthy may take precedence.222 In Liga van Moskeeën en 
Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen VZW v Vlaams Gewest, Advocate 
General Wahl noted the EU’s ‘wish to reconcile protection of the freedom to practise 
a religion with the protection of animal welfare’ and that the EU rules ‘strike a 
balance between the right to freedom of religion, on the one hand, and the 
requirements which flow from the protection of human health, animal welfare and 
food safety, on the other’.223 Similarly, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and 
Council, Regulation No 1007/2009 permitted ‘seal products’ to be sold where they 
were obtained from ‘hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous 
communities and contribute to their subsistence’.224 The preferencing of human 
cultural and religious interests over animal interests is also evident in Australia. For 
example, the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) recognises traditional Indigenous hunting 
rights and exempts native title holders from federal and state/territory laws that 
prohibit hunting or fishing in certain areas or of certain animals.225 
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4 Influence of Human Use on Human–Animal Relationships  
Legally acknowledging animal sentience may suggest that the value ascribed to 
animals, and treatment of animals, will be influenced primarily by the understanding 
that animals are sentient. In other words, given that the law accepts that animals are 
sentient, human interactions with animals may be expected to be governed by an 
intention to minimise unnecessary animal pain and suffering. Experience in New 
Zealand, however, indicates that the ways in which humans use animals, as opposed 
to legally acknowledged animal sentience, remains a significant influence on 
human-animal relationships. 
The New Zealand case of Erickson demonstrates the influence of human use 
of animals. In that case, the Court noted that, following the 2015 amendments, 
although the AWANZ drew a distinction between wild and domesticated animals, it 
did not distinguish between farm herd, working or companion animals.226 
Nevertheless, the Court stated that ‘it is inevitable’ that such distinction be made, 
particularly because ‘[t]he objects they are kept for are different’.227 Thus, it seems 
that while the AWANZ acknowledges that all animals are sentient, that sentience 
does not prevent distinctions being made between different types of animals, or the 
same type of animal in different contexts, based on their value to humans, rather than 
the degree to which they have feelings, perceptions and experiences. 
Comparison of the sentences in the cases of Witehira and Erickson may also 
support this conclusion. Witehira concerned sentencing the defendant for brutally 
bashing to death his son’s dog, while Erickson related to the violent conduct of a 
slaughterman towards 115 bobby calves.228 In Witehira, the sentence attached to the 
animal cruelty charges was 30 months’ imprisonment (prior to mitigating factors 
being applied), in comparison with 39 months’ imprisonment in Erickson.229 While 
various aggravating factors applied in each case, the broadly comparable starting 
points may be seen as indicative of the value that humans attach to a single family 
pet, as opposed to a significant number of livestock intended for slaughter. 
5 Exemptions from Animal Welfare Legislation 
One of the most significant failings of animal welfare laws, even in jurisdictions 
where sentience is expressly recognised, is that anti-cruelty legislation routinely 
excludes animals used in specified contexts.230 For example, under the AWA, the 
anti-cruelty provisions do not apply if the relevant conduct was in accordance with 
a code of practice.231 Codes of practice may deal with a variety of matters including, 
for example, animal welfare in intensive farming, trapping and snaring of animals, 
and animal welfare in the racing industry.232 Thus, conduct that is in accordance with 
                                                        
226 Erickson (n 166) 34. 
227 Ibid 1026 [34]. 
228 Note that in Erickson a number of the charges were brought on a representative basis: Erickson 
(n 166) 4. 
229 Witehira (n 172) 644 [26]; Erickson (n 166) 1033 [64]. 
230 See Ellis (n 157) 8. 
231 AWA (n 10) s 20. 
232 Ibid ss 21(j), (r), (y). 
308 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 42(3):281 
a code in relation to animal welfare in intensive farming will not breach the anti-
cruelty provisions set out in ss 7 and 7A even if it satisfies the definition of cruelty 
in s 6A. 
Codes of practice provide helpful guidance to people that work with animals 
by defining clearly what practices are acceptable and what are unacceptable.233 
However, the bodies that develop codes of practice may be perceived as biased given 
industry influence over them and a view that government agriculture departments 
have a conflict of interest.234 Further, there has been a failure to incorporate 
independent scientific research and research on community views in relation to 
animal welfare into the codes.235 As a result, the codes of practice and their 
incorporation into animal welfare legislation effectively permit ‘institutionalised 
cruelty to millions of animals’ in Australia each year.236 
V Reform Proposal for ACT and Other Australian 
Jurisdictions 
Explicitly acknowledging that animals are sentient is a positive step to improve legal 
protection for animals in the ACT. This is because it generates public awareness of 
the situation of animals, is likely to have an impact on the interpretation of other 
provisions within the AWA and may generate further legislative changes in this area. 
Accordingly, this article argues that the other states and territories within Australia 
should adopt amendments to their respective animal welfare laws to recognise 
animal sentience. 
Nevertheless, recognising animal sentience is only a very small step toward 
sufficiently protecting animals from human harm. Significant legal issues in the 
ACT and in other Australian jurisdictions remain, with the result being that animals 
continue to be vulnerable to human abuse. While this means that quite extensive 
legal reforms in this area are desirable, the reality is that meaningful change 
generally proceeds on an incremental basis. It was not until 1965, for example, that 
Indigenous Australians had the right to vote in all states and territories of 
Australia,237 and they continue to suffer from significant levels of discrimination.238 
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Given that this is the case, this article advocates only for the most pressing reforms 
to bring animal welfare law into line with recognition of animal sentience.239 
While all states and territories in Australia should recognise animal sentience 
in their laws, they should also explicitly link this recognition to obligations on 
humans to care for animals, as well as prohibitions on certain conduct towards 
animals. This is important because it clarifies why animal welfare is important and 
will make it more likely that the recognition of animal sentience will influence the 
statutory interpretation of other provisions. Further, it should be clarified that 
provisions within animal welfare legislation, such as prohibitions on causing 
unnecessary pain, should not be interpreted from the perspective of human interest, 
but from the perspective of the animal in question. 
This article advocates two further, more significant, changes. First, a national 
independent statutory agency, including animal welfare science and community 
ethics advisory committees, should be established, with responsibility for developing 
national animal welfare standards. This would address concerns about conflicts of 
interest in current code-setting arrangements and enable codes to better reflect 
community views regarding the ways in which animals should be treated.240 Second, 
in order to ensure that animal interests are sufficiently represented in decisions that 
affect them, people should have the capacity to legally represent animals. Further 
research is required to elaborate on the details of this proposed change to standing 
rules.241 However, the change should fundamentally enable people and organisations 
to bring legal actions on behalf of animals and to represent animals in existing 
proceedings where the relevant decision would affect those animals. 
VI Conclusion  
Legal recognition of animal sentience in the ACT is primarily of symbolic value. 
Commentary in relation to analogous legislation supports this conclusion. For 
example, Cupp asserts that ‘[d]escribing an animal as “sentient” does not in itself 
create new legal obligations’.242 Similarly, when discussing the legal recognition of 
animal sentience in France, Neumann states that ‘it can be considered as a highly 
“symbolic move” which should be warmly welcomed’.243 
Yet, legally recognising that animals are sentient still constitutes a significant 
step towards improving protections for animals in the ACT. The legal recognition of 
animal sentience does have very real potential to influence the interpretation of other 
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substantive provisions affecting animals.244 When interpreting legislation, courts in 
the ACT are required to interpret legislation in light of its purpose.245 Recognising 
animal sentience in the legislation, particularly as an expressed purpose of the 
legislation, is therefore likely to influence the interpretation of other provisions 
within the legislation. 
The legal recognition of animal sentience in the ACT will also have a broader 
impact. First, it is likely that the change will generate an increase in public awareness 
of the issues facing animals. In this respect, Gacek and Jochelson’s assertions that 
the ‘[l]aw can perform a symbolic function by identifying normative social values 
from which legal subjects are formed’ and that ‘[e]ven minor legal advances have 
the potential to bring into cultural consciousness new conceptions of ways to think 
of and discuss animal life and regulation’246 highlight the importance of such public 
awareness. As Cupp argues, ‘framing is a powerful tool’,247 and the language of 
sentience can help the public to think about animals in a more sophisticated, and 
hopefully more compassionate, way. Second, the legislative change is also likely to 
generate further legal changes in this space. In particular, other Australian 
jurisdictions are likely to adopt similar legislative changes. 
While acknowledging animal sentience is commendable, it nevertheless fails 
to address the significant ways in which the law renders animals vulnerable to human 
cruelty. In this respect, this article has suggested reforms to the law that stem directly 
from a genuine appreciation of animal sentience, and advocates that they be adopted 
in all Australian jurisdictions. First, the legal obligations that humans have vis-à-vis 
animals and the recognition of animal sentience should be expressly linked, and 
sentience should be the primary consideration taken into account when interpreting 
those obligations. Second, the Federal Government should establish a national 
independent statutory agency, including animal welfare science and community 
ethics advisory committees, to develop national animal welfare standards. Finally, 
humans and organisations should be empowered to legally represent animal interests, 
to ensure that their interests in avoiding pain and suffering, and in experiencing 
happiness and pleasure, are adequately represented and taken into account. 
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